Beware: In a Settlement Silence on Fees is Not Golden

Businessman offering you to sign a document with focus to the teIn DeSaulles v. Community Hospital (March 10, 2016) case no. S219236, the Supreme Court has weighed in with what it calls a “default” rule regarding which party may be entitled to costs when an action is dismissed by way of settlement.  Such a “default” rule in effect overturns the prior holding in Chinn v. KMR Property Management (2008) 166 Cal. App.4th 175, at 185–190.

The settlement in Desaulles was made and put on the record during trial as a result of rulings by the Court and included a monetary payment plus the Defendant to prepare a Judgment of Dismissal with prejudice with respect to certain adverse rulings that Plaintiff wanted to appeal.  The settlement preserved the right to seek costs after the appeal was complete:  “The Parties shall defer seeking any recovery of costs and fees on this Judgment coming final after the time for all appeals.”  Plaintiff filed an appeal and lost.  Upon remand, Plaintiff filed for costs as prevailing party and the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that Plaintiff was not the “prevailing party” under CCP 1032(a)(4), holding that under the statute, the monetary payment was a “net monetary recovery” which made the Plaintiff the prevailing party entitled to costs.

By referring to this as a “default” rule, the Court’s opinion applies to cases where the parties have not addressed “costs” in the settlement agreement or in a CCP 998 offer.

The  Supreme Court indicated this “default” may be altered by express agreement of the parties and that trial courts may look to such agreement of the parties when considering the issue of who is the prevailing party for purposes of costs when there has been a settlement. The Court stated:  “. . . settling parties are free to make their own arrangements regarding costs,”  and “Section 1032 merely establishes a default rule, and a settling defendant is in a far better position to calibrate the terms of a settlement, including allocations of costs, with appropriate provisions in the settlement.”

Costs, including defense fees as costs pursuant to a statute or contract, should be addressed in a written Settlement and Release Agreement which expressly provides either that costs are included in the settlement amount and/or that each side is waiving and releasing all claims, including costs. If there is an attorney fees provision at issue in the case, then a 998 offer should either include or exclude recoverable costs (which can include attorney fees).  If costs are excluded and Plaintiff accepts the 998 offer of money, plaintiff can then file a motion for recovery of fees as costs.  The same is true if a defendant accepts a Plaintiff’s 998 offer that is silent on the issue of costs.

For more information contact:

MICHAEL_GEIBEL_0309

Michael B. Geibel, Esq.

Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP

1880 Century Park East 12th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90067

email: mgeibel@gibbsgiden.com

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP (“Gibbs Giden”) for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel.

Copyright 2016 Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP ©

CA Adopts New Job Protections for Grocery Workers

On Tuesday, Governor Brown signed into law new protections for workers at large grocery stores.

AB 359, in essence, protects grocery store worker form being fired without cause for 90 days after a grocery store changes ownership. After the 90 day period, the new owner must “consider” offering continued employment the old workers. The law applies to grocery stores larger than 15,000 square feet.

The law makes California the first state in the nation to pass a statewide grocery worker retention law, but several cities, including San Francisco, Santa Monica, and Los Angeles already have local ordinances that provide similar protections to grocery workers.

California employers must comply with countless laws when implementing their personnel policies, some of which are distinct to California, and it is recommended they work closely with their employment counsel in navigating California’s complex legal landscape.

Also available at Gibbs Giden’s Labor and Employment Blog.

For more information contact:


David M.Prager, Esq.
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP
1880 Century Park East 12th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
email: dprager@gibbsgiden.com
The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP (“Gibbs Giden”) for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel.

Copyright 2015 Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP ©

Attorney Newsletter Advertisement

Greedy Cumis Counsel Who Pad Their Bills Beware

 

HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. J.R. MARKETING, L.L.C., et al., (Aug. 10, 2015) 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 599, 2015 WL 4716917

 

The California Supreme Court ruled that Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. can bring a direct action against Squire Patton Boggs LLP to recover some of the $13.5 million it paid the law firm as independent counsel under C.C. Section 2860 (Cumis) to defend its insured against claims that it stole business from a former employer.  In Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35 the Court held that an insurer who must defend the entire action even if some claims are not-covered may reserve its right to seek reimbursement back from the insured for fees allocated to the clearly non-covered claims.  The Court has taken the next step and held that the insurer also has the right to directly sue “Cumis” counsel for fee gouging, expressly finding that the financial responsibility for excessive billing should fall first on the law firm and not on the clients who face potential exposure for the acts of their lawyers.  “We see no persuasive ground to hold that any direct liability to Hartford for bill padding by Squire Sanders must fall solely on the insureds.”  The Court noted that the burden of proving the fees were unreasonable and unnecessary falls on the insurer.

hand cashw

The Court indicated its decision was limited to the facts and procedural history presented, which included an Order from the Court that foreclosed the insurer from “invoking the rate provisions of Section 2860” but also admonished that counsel’s bills must be “reasonable and necessary.”  The Order provided that the insurer could challenge the billings in a subsequent reimbursement action, and this Order was affirmed on appeal.  The Court expressed no view as to what rights an insurer that breaches its defense obligations might have to seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel under different circumstances, and noted that the enforcement Order eliminated Section 2860’s arbitration remedies.

 

The California Supreme Court’s ruling serves as a warning for private counsel to avoid court orders that allow insurers to pursue reimbursement of defense costs.  However, the analysis of the Court may have broader application.  When recognizing Cumis counsel and agreeing to discounted fee rates,  insurer’s may start expressly reserving their rights to seek reimbursement from the insured and from the insured’s private counsel.  Whether such a reservation of rights will be recognized given the limitations stated in Hartford v. J.R. Marketing is yet to be seen.  The best practice, as always, is for private counsel to be honest and reasonable in their billing practices and not assume their bills are immune from challenge if they treat the insurer as a cash cow.

For more information contact:

MICHAEL_GEIBEL_0309 (2)

Michael B. Geibel, Esq.
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP
1880 Century Park East, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067
Phone: (310) 552-3400
email: mgeibel@gibbsgiden.com

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP (“Gibbs Giden”) for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel.

Copyright 2015 Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP ©

Attorney Newsletter Advertisement

Netflix Offers Unlimited Parental Leave: What’s Your Company Policy?

AAEAAQAAAAAAAAM2AAAAJDRhMTQ4ZGVjLTQzNWYtNGFmMi1hNGI0LWM5NGViZjdjN2JjNw

Netflix upped the stakes in the tech industry when it announced it was implementing an unlimited fully-paid parental leave policy during the first year of a child’s birth or adoption.  Microsoft quickly announced that it was expanding its parental leave policy, extending fully paid time off to twelve weeks for both mothers and fathers, with an additional eight weeks of fully paid maternity disability leave for new mothers.

While generous parental leave benefits are fairly common in the highly-competitive tech industry, paid parental leave is uncommon across the United States.  No federal law requires an employer to offer paid time off to new parents, and only a handful of states provide paid time off to them.  For example, California provides new mothers and fathers six weeks of partial paid leave through the Paid Family Leave program, and new mothers with ten weeks (4 weeks pre-birth and 6 weeks after) of partial paid leave through the State Disability Insurance program.  Those programs are administered through the state, however, not the individual employer.

What’s Your Company Policy?

Even though employers are not legally required to provide paid parental leave, an employer’s own policies may require it to provide paid leave to new parents.  Generally, if an employer makes personal or medical leave available to its workers, it must make such leave available to pregnant employees and new parents.  The same is true for personal and vacation leave: employers generally must allow new parents to use this time off as parental leave if the employee meets the other requirements of the policy.  Whatever an employer’s policies are with respect to parental leave, those policies should apply equally to men and women to avoid a potential sex discrimination lawsuit.

Employers have to navigate a myriad of state and federal laws when developing their personnel policies, including their parental leave policies, and are advised to work closely with their employment counsel in doing so.

For more information contact:
David M. Prager, Esq.
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP
1880 Century Park East, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067
Phone: (310) 552-3400
email: dprager@gibbsgiden.com

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP (“Gibbs Giden”) for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel.

Copyright 2015 Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP ©

Attorney Newsletter Advertisement

Court of Appeal: Port of Long Beach Truckers Are Employees, Not Independent Contractors

AAEAAQAAAAAAAAM2AAAAJDRhMTQ4ZGVjLTQzNWYtNGFmMi1hNGI0LWM5NGViZjdjN2JjNw

 

The California Court of Appeal (Second District) has ordered publication of an opinion affirming a judgment in yet another employee-misclassification case.

 

Garcia v. Seacon Logix, Inc., involved allegations of employee misclassification brought by four Port of Long Beach truck drivers for Seacon before the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”).  The DLSE found the drivers should have been classified as employees and not independent contractors.  Seacon appealed the ruling to the Los Angeles Superior Court, where the court agreed with the DLSE.  Seacon then appealed the trial court’s ruling, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal in an opinion certified for publication on July 30, 2015.

 

Important to the Court of Appeal’s opinion, as in any employee misclassification case, was the amount of control Seacon exercised over the drivers.  The trial court found that the drivers credibly testified that Seacon tightly controlled the manner and means in which the work was performed, including controlling the drivers’ work hours, absences from work, delivery assignments, and use of trucks Seacon leased to them.  The Court also gave short shrift to Seacon’s argument that agreements signed by the drivers defined them as independent contractors, observing that “the language in the agreement giving the drivers control over their work and describing them as independent contractors is not dispositive.”

 

Employers and HR professionals utilizing independent contractors on a regular basis are advised to continually and diligently evaluate their independent contractor agreements, practices, and policies with their employment counsel to protect themselves against costly lawsuits.

 

The full opinion in Garcia v. Seacon Logix, Inc. can be found here.

 

For more information contact:
David M. Prager, Esq.
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP
1880 Century Park East, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067
Phone: (310) 552-3400
email: dprager@gibbsgiden.com

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP (“Gibbs Giden”) for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel.

Copyright 2015 Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP ©

Attorney Newsletter Advertisement

To Cash or Not to Cash? How to Handle a “Payment In Full” Check

hand cashw

What should you do when you receive a check from a customer for an amount less than your total claim, but the check is marked with a “payment in full” or similar restrictive notation?  Should you return the check to the debtor?  Or can you simply cross out the “payment in full” language, deposit the check and pursue the unpaid balance?  And what if you use a lockbox to handle the numerous checks you receive and those checks are deposited before you see them?

Short Answer

The answer to this question depends on what state law applies to your customer’s account.  In the vast majority of states, if you are not willing to accept the amount of a “payment in full” check, the only safe action is to return the unnegotiated check.  If you have accidentally negotiated a restricted check, many state laws give you a period of time (e.g., 90 days) to return the funds to the debtor to avoid an “accord and satisfaction” (the acceptance of a certain sum as payment for the entire disputed amount) of the claim.  Finally, even if you have negotiated a “payment in full” check, you may be able to avoid waiving your right to pursue the balance if the debt was undisputed, or if the debtor did not act in good faith.

Creditors that want to expansively address the problem of inadvertently accepting “payments in full,” resulting in an unintended accord and satisfaction, can create and conspicuously designate a “debt dispute office” in credit agreements and invoices to customers.  If such a debt dispute office procedure is appropriately implemented, an accord and satisfaction will not be established unless a person who is charged with the responsibility of dealing with such issues makes a knowing, affirmative decision to accept the partial payment.  If such a procedure is not established, creditors should implement an alternative process to identify all partial payments made by a customer that could result in an inadvertent accord and satisfaction within 90 days from the date payment is received.

It goes without saying that it is imperative that you understand the applicable state law, consider including a favorable governing law provision in your credit and sales agreements and consult with an experienced commercial attorney regarding your particular situation.  And if this topic has piqued your interest, please read on for more information and suggestions!

Some History and Context

The “full payment” check has an erratic history in different jurisdictions around the country.   Prior to the original adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) by most states about 50 years ago, the majority common law rule in the United States followed general contract law principles: the tender of a “full payment” check was an offer, and the creditor had no power to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the offer by reserving rights while simultaneously accepting the payment.  In other words, as long as it was clear that the check was tendered in full satisfaction of a disputed claim, the creditor’s deposit of the check was deemed a binding acceptance (notwithstanding any reservation of rights by the creditor) to the accord and satisfaction.

When states adopted the UCC in the 50’s and 60’s, a split developed among jurisdictions with respect to the consequences of negotiating a “payment in full” check.  A minority rule emerged in some states, including commercially significant jurisdictions such as New York and Illinois, holding that UCC section 1-207 (as originally enacted) displaced the common law accord and satisfaction rule, permitting the creditor to negotiate the check while preserving its rights as to the disputed balance by simply striking the restrictive notation.  Thereafter, some states enacted statutes (including California Civil Code section 1526) that effectively adopted the minority rule under which the creditor could negotiate the check without prejudicing its right to pursue the disputed balance by crossing out the “payment in full” notation or otherwise expressly reserving its rights. To make matters more confusing, some states have adopted various amendments to the UCC, including the 1990 Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code which sought to bring jurisdictions back in conformity with the common law majority rule.

The Legal Roller Coaster in California

There is no better example of the pervasive see-saw legal interpretation of “payment in full” checks than in the Golden State.   For decades, California followed the majority common law rule, including after its adoption of the UCC in 1963.   In 1987, however, California enacted Civil Code section 1526 in an effort to counteract unscrupulous debtors that used the “payment in full” check to chisel down legitimate debts.  By enacting section 1526, California effectively relegated itself to the minority rule under which a creditor could negotiate a “payment in full” check and by striking  out any restrictive notation (or otherwise expressly reserving its rights), preserve its right to the disputed balance.

Just six years after enacting section 1526, California adopted the 1990 Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code, including California Commercial Code section 3311.  Section 3311 directly contradicts Civil Code section 1526 and generally provides that cashing a check with restrictive language acts to prevent the creditor from later attempting to collect any additional disputed amounts, even if the creditor strikes any “payment in full” or similar notations.  Thus, the adoption of section 3311 should have returned California to the majority rule; the only problem is that the California legislature left Civil Code section 1526 on the books creating a irreconcilable conflict.

Commercial Code Section 3311 Wins the Statutory Tug of War in California. 

For almost 10 years, no California appellate court opinion acknowledged the direct conflict between the Civil Code and Commercial Code.  Two reported court decisions have now addressed the conflict of sections 1526 and 3311. Both courts (a California appellate court – Woolridge v. J.F.L. Electric, Inc. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th. Supp. 52  and a federal district court – Directors Guild of Am. v. Harmony Pictures, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 1998)) applied the maxim of statutory construction that when two statutes governing the same subject matter cannot be reconciled, the latter in time prevails.  As such, both courts, whose opinion provides persuasive authority to other California courts, held that the provisions of section 3311 prevail over section 1526.  In effect, both courts’ rulings bring California back into the majority rule, meaning that the recipients of “payment in full” checks must refuse such payments or take great care before cashing them, or else forfeit the legal right to pursue any unpaid balance.

In Woolridge, the plaintiff was the owner of a BMW that had been damaged in an automobile collision.  The insurance company for the defendant sent the plaintiff a check for less than the full amount of the damage claimed by the plaintiff.  The face of the check contained a notation that the check was in “full and final settlement” of the plaintiff’s claim.  The plaintiff tried to collect additional money from the insurance company after writing “partial payment” next to his endorsement and cashing the check. The trial court found that writing “partial payment” next to his endorsement was not sufficient to defeat the “full and final settlement” language put on the check by the insurance company.

The appellate court agreed that the plaintiff had accepted the check in full and final settlement of his claim and that he could not recover any further damages from the insurance company.  In doing so, the appellate court noted the conflicting accord and satisfaction statutes in California and held the statute enacted later in time –Commercial Code section 3311 – prevailed.  Reviewing the facts before it, the appellate court found that:  (1) there was clearly a dispute between the plaintiff and the insurance company over the amount due, and (2) the plaintiff cashed a check that contained conspicuous statements indicating that it was tendered in full and final satisfaction of the claim.  Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the requirements of section 3311 were met and an accord and satisfaction had been reached barring any further claim by the plaintiff against the insurance company.

A Closer Look at UCC Section 3-311 (and California Commercial Code  Section 3311) and the “Debt Dispute Office” Option

For those of you that love to read statutes, you can read UCC section 3-311 here, and the substantially similar California Commercial Code section 3311 here. (I’ll simply reference section 3311 hereafter).  Pursuant to section 3311, depositing a check which purports to be “payment in full” may prevent the creditor from suing to collect any additional disputed amounts if several requirements are met.

First, under section 3311, there must be a “bona fide dispute” between the parties as to the balance owed.  In other words, if there is not an honest dispute as to the amount of the debt (or that the debt is owed in the first place), tender of a “payment in full” check will not constitute an accord and satisfaction. For example, if it is undisputed that a debtor owes $500 on an open book account (because, for example, the debtor has admitted to the amount due), the debtor’s tender of a check in the amount of $100 marked “payment in full” will not operate as an accord and satisfaction.  On the other hand, if the debtor genuinely contends that it did not order $400 worth of goods, the tender of such a check, if accepted, may establish an accord and satisfaction.  Of course, in reality, a debtor sending a $100 payment will likely argue that there was a genuine dispute as to the balance owed.

Second,the check in question must be tendered in “good faith.” Using the above example, if the debtor was trying to sneak in a “payment in full” notation on a partial payment in the hope that the creditor would not pick up on the accord and satisfaction (because, for example, the debtor knows the creditor uses a lock box and rarely reviews the actual check or because it believes it can take advantage of a new and inexperienced credit manager), the tender of the check is not likely to constitute a “good faith” tender and will not establish an accord and satisfaction.

Third, the debtor must “conspicuously” disclose on the check or accompanying written communication that the partial payment is being tendered as full satisfaction of the claim. This requirement may be satisfied by simply writing “payment in full” on the check itself or by enclosing a letter or memorandum with the check which states that the payment is being made in full satisfaction of the claim.  The UCC defines “conspicuous” as a “term or clause…so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.”  A printed heading in capitals is conspicuous (e.g., “PAYMENT IN FULL”), as is language in the body of an accompanying written communication if it is in larger type or contrasting type or color.

If the above three requirements are met, the customer must accept the payment in order for it to constitute an accord and satisfaction. Obviously, depositing the check constitutes acceptance, but so can endorsing the payment to a third party or even holding the check for an extended period of time. Therefore, it is wise for a creditor not only to hold or even destroy the check, but to return the check to the debtor with correspondence expressly refusing the payment.  The payment should be returned via certified mail or express delivery with third party delivery confirmation.

Finally, section 3311 gives the creditor further protection by allowing the creditor to designate a particular person or office to which all communications regarding “disputed debts” (expressly including “payment in full” checks) are to be sent.  In order to take advantage of this “debt dispute office” solution, the creditor must provide the debtor with a conspicuous statement that all “payment in full” checks must be sent to the designated person or office.  Thus, if the creditor make such a conspicuous designation on account statements, credit or sales agreements and/or invoices, restrictive checks sent to any undesignated person or office (including a lockbox) rather than the debt dispute designee will generally protect the creditor from unintentionally establishing an accord and satisfaction.

Know Your Rights and Consider Establishing a Debt Dispute Office

In light of the foregoing, when there is a dispute between a debtor and creditor, and the debtor submits a “payment in full” check for less than the full amount owing to the creditor, the only true safe practice in jurisdictions such as California may be for the creditor to return the check to the debtor.  Creditors must carefully scrutinize all checks and all written communications that accompany any checks for “payment in full” or similar language before making a deposit at the bank.  If a lockbox is used and/or checks are deposited without inspecting each check or accompanying correspondence, the creditor should adopt a review procedure so that it can identify restricted checks within 90 days from deposit to utilize the statutorily authorized return process and avoid an accord and satisfaction of the claim.  Even if you have negotiated a “payment in full” check and the 90 day safe harbor provision has passed, you may still be able to avoid waiving your right to pursue the balance if the debt was undisputed, or if the debtor did not act in good faith.  Finally, consider expansively addressing the problem of inadvertently accepting “payments in full” by creating and designating a “debt dispute office” as authorized by section 3311.

Every circumstance presents a unique set of facts.  Moreover, as described above, some states have adopted a modified version of UCC section 3-311 or have enacted statutes that conflict with section 3-311.  In developing a particular approach to dealing with the accord and satisfaction problem for your organization, you should consult with your general counsel or experienced commercial attorney.

For more information about this topic please contact:

Christopher E. Ng, Esq.
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP
1880 Century Park East 12th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067

email: cng@gibbsgiden.com

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP (“Gibbs Giden”) for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel.

Copyright 2015 Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP ©

Attorney Newsletter Advertisement

CA Appellate Court Certifies Class in Safeway Meal Break Case

AAEAAQAAAAAAAAM2AAAAJDRhMTQ4ZGVjLTQzNWYtNGFmMi1hNGI0LWM5NGViZjdjN2JjNw

California Appellate Court Certifies Class Based on Employer’s Practice of Never Paying Premium Wages For Missed Meal Breaks

On Wednesday, the California Court of Appeal (Second District) upheld an order certifying a class of Safeway employees alleging violation of California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) based on the theory that Safeway had a practice of never paying the premium wages required for missed meal breaks outlined in Labor Code § 226.7.

Alleging violations of the unfair completion law in conjunction with violations of the Labor Code is not itself a novel theory, and the Court of Appeal in this case had no trouble concluding “that a UCL claim may be predicated on a practice of not paying premium wages for missed, shortened, or delayed meal breaks attributable to the employer’s instructions or undue pressure, and unaccompanied by a suitable employee waiver or agreement.”

Under such a theory, even technical compliance with the Labor Code and California law with respect to meal breaks (e.g., providing employees with a reasonable opportunity to take full rest breaks, free from all work duties) may not be sufficient to avoid a class claim under the UCL if a plaintiff can sufficiently allege a practice of never paying premium wages when required.  Employers are advised to diligently review their practices and policies on a regular basis to ensure full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations and provide adequate protections against potential claims for meal and rest break violations.

The case is Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court (Esparza), and the full opinion can be found here.

For more information contact:
David M. Prager, Esq.
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP
1880 Century Park East, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067
Phone: (310) 552-3400
email: dprager@gibbsgiden.com

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP (“Gibbs Giden”) for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel.

Copyright 2015 Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP ©

Attorney Newsletter Advertisement